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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. *
OPENING STATEMENT
In State v. Bell' the district attorney objected to the defense
attorney's opening statement to the jury. The prosecutor said "Your
honor, I hate to interrupt Counsel, but he is arguing his case, he is
not allowed to do that, he is to outline the evidence he ig to present,
that's the purpose of an opening statement."2 The defense counsel at
the time of the objection was telling the jury that they must acquit
the defendant unless the state proved every element of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.' The trial court sustained the objection
on the basis that defense counsel was making a legal argument.'
The supreme court found no error in sustaining the objection.
The court followed its earlier decision in State v. Spencer5 where it
was held that although articles 766-69 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure apply only to the state, if defense counsel avails himself of the
opportunity to make an opening statement, he must confine his re-
marks to "an explanation of the nature of the defense and the evi-
dence by which he expects to establish it."' Quoting Spencer, the
court said that wide discretion was vested in the trial court in control-
ling the defendant's opening statement within the above limits. The
court held that the jurisprudence predating the Code which defined
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 263 La. 434, 268 So. 2d 610 (1972).
2. Id. at 445, 268 So. 2d at 614.
3. "Gentlemen of the Jury, as Mr. Ware stated when he read the statute of armed
robbery to you, that through the evidence that he outlined, he must prove to your
satisfaction to a moral certainty, that the Defendant was involved in this take, the
Defendant had actual knowledge of what Sheppard did. Now, he must prove every
element of this crime to a moral certainty. If he leaves out any evidence-if he leaves
out any element, I mean, that doesn't satisfy your moral certainty, then you must
acquit. Now, as I stressed in the Voir Dire examination, the Defendant, Leonard Bell,
in this case, does not have to do anything. That as of this time, each of you told me,
at this time you convened, the Defendant to be innocent and he is to remain innocent
until the State of Louisiana can prove beyond a reasonable doubt or moral certainty,
every element of the crime of armed robbery. Now, we don't ask for you to make any
conclusions now and we know that you haven't, I didn't any way because you told me
you hadn't. However, I do ask that when each of these witnesses takes the stand and
you are the judge-." Id. at 444, 268 So. 2d at 614.
4. Id. at 446, 268 So. 2d at 614.
5. 257 La. 672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971).
6. State v. Bell, 263 La. 434, 448, 268 So. 2d 610, 615 (1972), quoting State v.
Spencer, 257 La. 672, 682, 243 So. 2d 793, 797 (1971).
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the scope of the defense opening statement still had applicability.7
That jurisprudence referred to the "opening statement by counsel for
the defendant at his option explaining the defense and the evidence
by which he expects to prove the same." 8
The writer does not feel that the court erred in limiting the scope
of the defense opening statement. The defense counsel who avails
himself of an opportunity to make an opening statement should not,
for example, be permitted to misstate the law or to give his opinion
of his client's innocence. Also, neither the prosecutor nor the defense
counsel should be permitted to argue his case in the opening state-
ment. If the opening statement is couched in argumentative terms,
the court should have the discretion to limit counsel's remarks. How-
ever, the trial court should not limit defense counsel to an opening
statement only when he intends to present an affirmative defense. If
the defense theory is to put the state to its burden of proof, counsel
should certainly be permitted to explain that in an opening state-
ment.
It is submitted, however, that the court should not apply the
exclusionary provisions of article 769 to the defendant who exercises
his option to make an opening statement. That provision excludes
that evidence "not fairly within the scope of the opening statement
of the state" and clearly only applies to the state. Similarly, article
766 which the court has applied to the defense also seems to refer only
to the state.
In State v. Jones' the defense objected when the prosecutor
stated in his opening statement, "Mr. Jones stated that he had pur-
chased the unit,"10 obviously referring to the air conditioner defen-
dant was charged with stealing. Citing its earlier decision, State v.
7. Former La. R.S. 15:333: "The jury having been impaneled and the indictment
read, the trial shall proceed in the following order:
The reading of the plea to the jury; the opening statement of the district
attorney explaining the nature of the charge and the evidence by which he expects to
establish the same; the opening statement by counsel for the defendant at his option
explaining the defense and the evidence by which he expects to prove the same; the
introduction by the district attorney of all the evidence upon which he relies for a
conviction; the introduction by the defendant of all of his evidence; the introduction
by the district attorney of the rebuttal evidence; the argument of the district attorney
of those matters upon which he relies for a conviction; the argument by the defendant
or by his counsel; the reply by the district attorney to the argument of the defense;
the judge's charge to the jury; the retiring of the jury under the custody of the sheriff;
the rendition of the verdict or the entry of a mistrial, as the case may be; the discharge
of the jury."
8. Id.
9. 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
10. Id. at 177, 267 So. 2d at 564.
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Fink," the court classified that statement as neither inculpatory nor
a confession. The court seemed to say that the statement was not an
"admission of incriminating facts" and was in fact exculpatory since
the defendant was attempting to convince the police officers that he
had purchased the air conditioning units which he was charged with
stealing. Since the statement was classified as exculpatory it did not
fall within the scope of article 767 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
"The state shall not, in the opening statement, advert in any way to
a confession or inculpatory statement made by the defendant."'"
It is evident that the prosecutor in Jones was not introducing
that statement because of its tendency to exculpate the defendant.
Rather he was probably using it for its inculpatory effect. The Su-
preme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona did not
distinguish between the inculpatory and exculpatory statements with
regard to the need for Miranda warnings:
The privilege against self incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it
does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for pre-
cisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between
inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely
"exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory
it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact,
statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to
prove guilt by implication. 4
The Louisiana supreme court has, it seems, distinguished be-
tween inculpatory and exculpatory statements in interpreting article
767. The clear language of the article refers to confessions and incul-
patory statements. It does not seem to include exculpatory state-
ments which tend to have an inculpatory effect under the circum-
stances.
The theory underlying articles 767 and 768 is to exclude reference
to the confession or inculpatory statement in the opening statement
while still allowing the defendant to be aware that the state intends
to use the statement by requiring written notice prior to the opening
statement. This procedure avoids the possible prejudice which might
11. 255 La. 385, 231 So. 2d 360 (1970).
12. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 767. (Emphasis added.)
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Id. at 476.
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flow from the district attorney's reference to a confession or inculpa-
tory statement in his opening statement and then not being able to
have the statement admitted into evidence.'5 Since Miranda also
applies to exculpatory statements, it would seem that the better prac-
tice would be to require the district attorney to use the article 768
notice provision if he intends to introduce the "exculpatory" state-
ment of the defendant in evidence. Similarly article 767 should be
applied to forbid the state's mention of the "exculpatory" statement
in its opening statement. This avoids the possibility that the prosecu-
tor and the court may disagree on the nature of the statement and
also forecloses the possibility that the prosecutor may mention an
exculpatory statement in his opening statement then not be able to
introduce it.'"
In State v. Bell,'7 an armed robbery case, although reversed on
other grounds, the court found reversible error in the prosecutor's
opening remarks referring to four other armed robberies alleged to
have been committed by the defendant. The court said that "[n]ot
one scintilla of evidence, however, was offered on the trial connecting
the defendant with two of these robberies." 8 The only evidence con-
necting Bell to the other two robberies was through testimony elicited
in the prosecutor's effort to impeach a co-defendant witness.
The court indicated disapproval of the mentioning of extraneous
offenses in the opening statement which the state does not later
prove. Article 770 mandates mistrial when the district attorney di-
rectly or indirectly mentions within the hearing of the jury "another
crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant
as to which evidence is not admissible."' 9 This provision directsitself
to other crimes which are not admissible as opposed to other crimes
which are admissible, but not introduced at trial. In Bell the court
did not cite its earlier decision in State v. Prieur0 and did not discuss
the admissibility of evidence of the other unproved armed robberies.
Rather the court in Bell was concerned with the fact that no evidence
was introduced to prove the crimes and not whether the evidence
15. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 769, comment (C)(2).
16. See State v. Cannon, 184 La. 514, 520, 166 So. 2d 485, 487 (1936), in which
the prosecutor was charged with reading defendant's confession to the jury in his
opening statement. The confession was admitted but the court said: "This would
certainly have been reversible error if the confession, unless offered, had been excluded
by the court .... " Cannon is cited in comment (b) to article 769.
17. 279 So. 2d 164 (La. 1973).
18. Id. at 166.
19. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770(2).
20. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
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would have been admissible had the state attempted to do so.
Justice Summers in his dissent said that the district attorney is
required to make an opening statement in which he sets forth in
general terms the nature of the evidence which he expects to offer.
"The object of this law is to place the defendant on notice of the facts
he has to face at the trial. At least this object is served by overstating
what is intended to be proved."'" Justice Summers argued that a
"strong inference would seem to follow"" when the state does not
produce evidence against a defendant that the state "could not prove
its whole case-an inference favorable to the accused."2 Justice
Summers further argued that the court should not reverse unless the
district attorney is in bad faith by referring to other crimes, then not
producing any evidence of them. He pointed to the logic of this posi-
tion particularly in cases where such proof may be unnecessary and
merely cumulative. He also cited the vicissitudes of a trial which are
unforeseeable, where as in Bell, a witness who had previously given
evidence against an accused had to be impeached.
The writer submits that the court should take the position that,
due to the notice provisions in Prieur, the district attorney should not
mention any other offense in his opening statement which is covered
by the notice. This would certainly keep the prosecutor from having
to run the risk of mentioning other crimes which would be admissible,
but which it later develops he cannot prove. It would prevent the
possibility of prejudice to the defendant while still giving him ad-
vance notice of their intended use.
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
In State v. Randolph,4 the supreme court found that the trial
court abused its discretion in its denial of a new trial. The defendant,
charged with armed robbery, was alleged to have stolen $96.00 which
the defendant claimed were back wages owed by the victim. At a
preliminary hearing a trial judge found no probable cause to hold the
defendant for armed robbery and reduced his bail substantially. Ran-
dolph was nevertheless prosecuted and convicted of armed robbery.
The supreme court stated that "fairly untechnically construed, the
defendant's motion for a new trial raises the contention that there is
a total lack of evidence that he took anything of value belonging to
another, an essential element of the offense of armed robbery." 5
21. State v. Bell, 279 So. 2d 164, 167 (La. 1973).
22. Id. at 167.
23. Id.
24. 275 So. 2d 174 (La. 1973).
25. Id. at 176. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 386.
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The court based its finding that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying a new trial on several factors. 21 What is interesting
about the opinion is its apparent willingness to reverse a trial court's
refusal to a grant a new trial "in the interest of justice. 2 The court
cited article 85821 limiting review of a trial court's refusal to grant a
new trial except for an error of law. The court nevertheless said that
"an abuse of the trial court's discretion on either of the grounds
cited 2 has been regarded as a question of law-although, of course,
great weight must be attached to exercise of the trial court's discre-
tion, which should not be disturbed on review in absence of clear
abuse."30
In a similar vein, the court reversed a conviction in State v.
Dickerson." Again, the court seems to have been presented with a
26. The court also found that the trial court erred in failing to provide a full
transcript. "Our finding is to some extent based upon the extreme facts of this case,
which show: (a) without contradiction, a bona fide dispute about the payment of wages
in the presence of many witnesses, i.e., no pattern of criminal conduct; (b) the belated
but diligent discovery, after conviction, of witnesses only transiently at the scene, who
strongly indicate the defendant's innocence of criminal conduct or intent (and no real
opportunity, until after the trial, to produce such independent proof, where the defense
at the trial was based upon the testimony of the defendant alone); (c) the actions of
the trial court at the preliminary examination, indicating the apparent weakness of
the state's case; (d) the testimony of the prosecuting witness at the trial substantially
increasing and changing the alleged criminal nature of the defendant's conduct, as
compared with his testimony at the preliminary examination (with the intimations of
prosecutorial overkill); and (e) the lack of a real opportunity, until the new witnesses
were discovered after the conviction, to present evidence from independent witnesses
which casts great doubt upon the version of the prosecuting witness, nor the real need
to do so until the prosecuting witness produced his trial version of the incident." State
v. Randolph, 275 So. 2d 174, 176-77 (La. 1973).
27. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(5): "The motion for a new trial is based on the
supposition that injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to
have been the case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is
grounded.
"The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
"(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the
granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a
matter of strict legal right."
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 858: "Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction
of the supreme court may be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant a
new trial, except for error of law."
29. The motion also alleged the existence of new and material evidence not discov-
ered which probably would have changed the verdict. See LA. CODE CraM. P. art.
851(3).
30. 275 So. 2d at 177.
31. 282 So. 2d 456 (La. 1973).
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"hard case. '3 The defendant was charged with possession of heroin
discovered near his car by officers.3 3 Another individual, present with
the defendant at the time of the arrest and seizure, testified at a
motion to suppress.3 4 The witness was subpoenaed by the defendant
for the trial, but failed to appear. The defense orally moved to con-
tinue, arguing the necessity of his testimony. The defendant's attor-
ney argued that the testimony of the witness would corroborate the
defendant's allegation that certain details of the police officers' ac-
count of the arrest and seizure were incorrect. 35 The trial court denied
the motion but issued a subpoena. The defense sought to introduce
the testimony given by the witness at the motion to suppress which
was also denied.3 7 The jury found the defendant guilty. It was deter-
32. See Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Campbell Comm. Co., 77 F. 705 (8th Cir.
1896).
33. The court cited these details in a footnote: "The officers testified that they
followed defendant's car, with their blue lights flashing, in order to issue a citation for
illegal exhausts and that they pulled behind defendant's vehicle when it parked on the
right side of S. Liberty Street, but parked closer to the curb than defendant had. They
further testified that they exited their police vehicle before the defendant and Hunter
left their car, and Office Pacaccio testified that he saw the defendant drop a whitish
object from his left hand as he was exiting from the driver's side. The officer acknowl-
edged that it was dark at the time he approached defendant's car, but insisted that
he could see adequately because his police vehicle, with headlights on, was parked
closer to the curb than defendant's car, and the headlights shown down the side of
defendant's car and adequately illuminated defendant's exist. Both officers testified
that Dickerson exited from the driver's side of the vehicle and Hunter exited from the
passenger side.
"On the other hand, Hunter, an admitted heroin addict, and the defendant,
testified that the police vehicle was parked on the street, alongside their car, and not
behind it. They estimated that the police vehicle's front door was even with their back
door. Dickerson and Hunter both testified that Hunter exited from the driver's side,
like Dickerson, and not from the passenger side. Dickerson stated that the passenger
door was stuck. Both men testified that the heroin was found in a handkerchief on the
ground. The police, even when asked about the presence of a handkerchief, stated that
the heroin was found in a clear cellophane container, and that there was no handker-
chief. Both men testified that the officer who was looking around the car used a
flashlight to look inside the car and around on the ground. The police officer who
recovered the heroin stated that he did not have a flashlight on his person, and that
he could see the heroin dropped to the ground because his headlights were illuminating
the area." State v. Dickerson, 282 So. 2d 456, 457 (La. 1973).
34. The witness was arrested but not tried with the defendant.
35. See facts cited in note 33 supra.
36. Article 707 requires a written motion for continuance.
37. Article 295 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the admission of
testimony given at a preliminary hearing under the proper circumstances. There are
also provisions in La. R.S. 15:257-58 regarding the perpetuation of testimony of wit-
nesses and the circumstances under which this is available to a'defendant. Neither
were applicable in this case.
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mined later that the witness was at the time of the trial in jail on an
unrelated charge under a different name and had told no one of the
subpoena."
In his motion for a new trial, the defense attorney alleged that
he discovered subsequent to the trial that the witness was a police
informant. No evidence of this was produced but the trial judge nev-
ertheless found that the "newly discovered evidence" probably would
not have changed the verdict. The supreme court reversed, stating
we believe that this bit of new evidence, coupled with the new
information that Hunter had been in Central Lockup under an
alias at the time his testimony was needed for defendant's trial
and was unavailable for reasons beyond the defendant's control,
should require and does require that defendant be granted a new
trial and be allowed to present for jury's consideration Hunter's
corroborative version of the facts which led to the officers' discov-
ery of the heroin and the subsequent arrest of Dickerson and
Hunter. 9
The court recognized that the defendant's motion to continue
was not in proper form. The refusal to admit the testimony taken at
the suppression hearing was not necessarily an abuse of discretion. 0
Nevertheless, on the basis of "all of these matters . . . accumulated
and considered in light of the motion for new trial,"4' the court found
that to affirm would constitute "a denial of due process and a depri-
vation of a fair trial for the defendant. 42
The writer respectfully submits that the court here, and in
Randolph, reversed because it basically felt that the "ends of justice
38. Defense counsel checked the jail but did not, of course, find the name of the
witness on the jail list.
39. 282 So. 2d at 458-59.
40. "It has been held, and it must be recognized, that evidence taken in a prelimi-
nary proceeding upon a limited issue different or foreign to the one presented on the
trial of the case cannot be admitted at the trial because its admission would infringe
on the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witness." State v. Augustine,
252 La. 983, 999, 215 So. 2d 634, 639 (1968). The court cited Augustine and while the
sixth amendment right to confrontation applies only to the defendant, the state also
must have the right to cross-examine the defense witnesses on the issues presented at
trial. In its per curiam the trial judge said: "The testimony of the witness from the
hearing on the motion to suppress was inadmissible at the trial because at that hearing,
the district attorney's cross-examination was limited to the issue before the Court, i.e.,
the admissibility of the evidence seized. The district attorney's cross-examination at
trial would not have been so limited." State v. Dickerson, 282 So. 2d 256, 259.
41. 282 So. 2d 456, 459 (La. 1973).
42. Id.
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would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defen-
dant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal
right."4 A possible reason why the court would hesitate to reverse on
that ground is the difficulty in determining that it was an "error of
law" for the trial judge to refuse to grant a new trial. However, in
Randolph, the court seemed to say that an abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant a new trial where the "ends of justice" required it
was an error of law. The writer submits that the court should make
it clear that they will review the exercise of discretion in the trial
judge's refusal to grant a new trial where the "ends of justice will be
served" as an error of law if in fact that is what the court is doing. It
would seem that this would aid defense counsel, prosecutors, and
trial judges in building a proper record.
INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO TRANSCRIPT
Louisiana's bill of exceptions procedure" and our constitutional
limitation on the appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana supreme
court to questions of law in criminal cases45 had led the court to hold
that indigents are only entitled to an appellate transcript which is
only sufficient to allow the court to review all of the defendant's bills
of exceptions reserved." In State v. Brewer,7 the defendant filed a
motion for a new trial alleging that his conviction was contrary to the
law and the evidence.4" He later supplemented his motion by urging
that there was no evidence to support the conviction. The defendant,
an indigent, argued that he was entitled to a full transcript to assure
proper review of that bill of exception.
The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to produce a full
transcipt, pointing to the fact that the defendant's motion failed to
allege with specificity the missing elements or evidence. The court
noted that
the scope of appellate review in criminal matters covers 'ques-
tions of law alone.' Determination of factual questions of guilt or
innocence, such as whether, or not the defendant acted in self
defense, or in the heat of passion upon provocation, or was under
43. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(5).
44. Id. arts. 841, 920.
45. LA. CONST., art. VII, § 10.
46. Mack v. Walker, 372 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107,
229 So. 2d 329 (1969); State v. Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962).
47. 263 La. 113, 267 So. 2d 541 (1972).
48. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(1).
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the influence of alcohol, as he alleges inter alia, is within the sole
province of the jury.1 9
The court felt that the partial transcript provided a full base for
appellate review.
In State v. Randolph,5 the court felt that due to the circumstan-
ces presented5' the trial court erred in refusing to provide a full tran-
script. The court made it clear that every defendant who moves for a
new trial based on a total lack of evidence of an essential element of
the offense will not automatically be entitled to a full transcript.
Total lack of evidence of an essential element of an offense is, of
course, a question of law. 52 Because of the unique circumstances, the
court felt that full review of the defendant's allegations of error would
be impossible without a full transcript. The court, however, noted in
the opinion that if the state felt that a review of the full transcript
would lead to a different conclusion, the court would consider a re-
mand to complete the transcript upon the state's application for
rehearing.53
In State v. Gilbert,4 the defendant moved for a directed verdict
immediately after the state rested. When this was denied the defense
attorney moved that the court supply the defendant, an indigent,
with a transcript of all of the evidence presented by the state to
attach to his bill of exceptions. The trial judge denied the request.
On appeal, the defendant was supplied with those portions of the
transcript necessary to his other bills of exceptions. The court found
that from that testimony alone the state had established a prima
facie case against the accused. 55 The court, citing Mayer v. Chicago,5"
thus concluded that the defendant had shown no "colorable need for
a complete transcript."57
The writer submits that the approach taken by the cases is con-
sistent and reasonable. If the defendant makes allegations of error
49. 263 La. at 122, 267 So. 2d at 544.
50. 275 So. 2d 174 (La. 1973).
51. See note 26 supra.
52. State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 (La. 1973).
53. No rehearing was applied for by the state.
54. 286 So. 2d 345 (La. 1973).
55. "Included in that transcript was the testimony of several eyewitnesses to the
armed robbery," 286 So. 2d 345, 350 (La. 1973).
56. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
57. 345 So. 2d at 350. The court further said: "We also conclude that the
defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial judge denying a complete
transcript of the testimony for had he been supplied with a complete transcript, his
motion for a directed verdict would nonetheless have been denied, in view of the
testimony of Mr. O'Corr, without more." Id. at 350.
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which require the entire transcript, under Randolph, they are entitled
to it. However, under Brewer, the defendant must pinpoint to a rea-
sonable degree of certainty the elements of the crime which have been
omitted so that the trial court can decide, as in Gilbert, whether
evidence provided with other bills, or specific additional transcript,
will be sufficient to permit full review by the supreme court.
The problem presented by Justice Barham in State v. Anderson"
regarding the application of harmless error principles still exists. Jus-
tice Barham, in Anderson, said in order to apply the federal harmless
error standard the reviewing court, among other things, "must deter-
mine from its examination of the complete record whether the un-
tainted-that is, admissible-evidence overwhelmingly supports a
finding of the guilt of the accused. ' '59 The writer submits that even
under article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a review of the
entire transcript may be necessary for the court to determine whether
or not "after an examintion of the entire record, it appears that the
error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice,
is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes
a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." 0 Trial
judges should be liberal in'providing full transcripts for indigents on
appeal if it is anticipated that the question of harmless error may
arise.
USE OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY
In State v. Sam,6 ' the supreme court reversed a manslaughter
conviction as a result of the prosecutor's use of the preliminary hear-
ing testimony of a witness who the state contended was unavailable.
The court did not feel that the state had shown that the witness was
"diligently sought without avail '6 2 or that the state had made "a good
faith effort to secure the witness' presence at the trial. '6 3 Article 295
of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the use of the testi-
mony of a witness taken at a preliminary hearing in "any subsequent
proceeding in the case" 4 if the trial court finds that the witness
"cannot be found"6 and his absence was not procured by the party
seeking to introduce the testimony.
58. 254 La. 1107, 229 So. 2d 329 (1969).
59. Id. at 1143, 229 So. 2d at 342.
60. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921.
61. 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973).
62. 283 So. 2d at 85.
63. Id.
64. LA. CODE CRnM. P. art 295.
65. Id.
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The witness was a 15-year-old high school student who testified
at the peliminary examination that he had seen the defendant and
no other persons go to the decedent's apartment near the time esti-
mated by the medical witness to be the approximate time of death."
The defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary hear-
ing.67 The court noted that
[t]he examination and cross-examination as to where he [the
witness] was when he observed the defendant and how consecu-
tive and detailed his observation was of other possible visitations
was at best sketchy. This might be expected of a pre-indictment
preliminary examination principally directed to probable cause
for a charge for the offense with which held .... 61
The state issued a subpoena for the witness which was returned
by the sheriff with a notation that the sheriff was "unable to lo-
cate-Moved to unknown."6 The state introduced only the sheriff's
return as its predicate for admitting the preliminary examination
testimony. The supreme court noted that "Barber v. Page indicates
that the state may nevertheless introduce such testimony taken at a
preliminary examination 'where the witness is shown to be actually
unavailable . . . ' provided adequate opportunity for cross-
examination was afforded at the preliminary examination."7
Barber' involved a case where the prosecutor made no effort to obtain
66. The witness said he saw the defendant, an estranged boyfriend of the victim,
enter the apartment at 11:00 a.m. and leave approximately ten minutes later. He
further said he saw no one else enter or leave the apartment until 3:00 p.m. when he
left his home, a nearby apartment. Medical testimony placed the time of death be-
tween 9:45 a.m. and 12:00 noon. The court found that the witness' testimony was the
"only testimony to place him [the defendant] there within the medical estimate of
the probability of death between 9:45 a.m. and noon." 283 So. 2d 81, 83. There was
no eyewitness to the killing, and the victim was found dead in her apartment.
67. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
68. 283 So. 2d at 82.
69. "The state argues that Bellizan's preliminary-examination testimony could be
introduced at the merit-trial because he was unavailable and could not be found. The
state introduced no testimony to this effect but simply relied upon the sheriff's return
of December 22, 1971, to a subpoena to Bellizan issued on December 17, 1971. The
return was dated one month and two days before the trial date of January 24, 1972.
"The address of Bellizan shown on the subpoena is his address at the time of the
preliminary examination some five months earlier. Without further elaboration, the
sheriff's return checked printed descriptive phrases: 'Unable to locate' and 'Moved to
unkown', the last italicized word being completed in ink." State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d
81, 84 (La. 1973).
70. Id.
71. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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the presence of a witness who was out of state in federal custody.72
The court has clearly shown that it will require the prosecutor
offering such testimony to carry the burden of showing a diligent
search without avail or a good faith effort to have the witness at trial.
It will not presume that this has been done simply because a sub-
poena was issued and the witness not located. The court seems to
require a showing by the state regarding what was done by the sub-
poena server to locate the witness. The court cited its earlier affirm-
ances in State v. Jones73 and State v. Nelson.74 In Nelson the state
produced the testimony of a district attorney's investigator, to the
effect that he checked the last known address and phone number and
that he checked utility and credit bureau records. The state also
called a person who had known the witness for two years who was
unable to "supply any information that would be helpful in locating
her."75 In Jones the state introduced the preliminary examination
testimony of two foreign seamen at the defendant's trial for armed
robbery of one of the seamen. Although the state only issued a sub-
poena the day before the trial and the sheriff's return only indicated
that the seamen could not be located because their ship was not in
port, the court held that the "belated and limited search"7 was suffi-
cient because
a specific purpose of the preliminary examination was to perpetu-
ate the testimony of the Norwegian seamen for later use at the
trial, because they would be unavailable when their Norwegian
ship left immediately after the preliminary examination ...
From the testimony taken at the preliminary examination, there
72. "In its unanimous reversal of the state conviction, the Supreme Court stated,
'In short, a witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the foregoing exception to the
confrontation clause unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort
to obtain his presence at the trial.' 390 U.S. 724-25. The court concluded, 390 U.S. 725-
26: 'The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity
to cross-examination and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the
merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of
determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there
may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a
witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demand of the confrontation clause where
the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out,
such a case.' " State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81, 84 (La. 1973).
73. 261 La. 422, 259 So. 2d 899 (1972).
74. 261 La. 153, 259 So. 2d 46 (1972).
75. Id. at 164, 259 So. 2d at 50.
76. 261 La. at 428, 259 So. 2d at 902.
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was no expectation that they would return to Louisiana for the
trial."
Clearly the court will interpret article 295 in light of the defen-
dant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.7"
The court will require that the phrase "cannot be found" be inter-
preted in light of the Barber requirement that the state make a dili-
gent, good faith effort to obtain a witness' presence before using pre-
liminary hearing testimony. Perhaps more significant is the fact that
the court seems to require that the state make a showing on the record
regarding the effort made to locate the witness and to obtain his
presence.
The writer submits that the court's position is fair and reasona-
ble. By requiring a showing of the efforts to locate the witness (other
than merely the fact that a subpoena was issued and not served
because the server could not locate the witness), the reviewing court
has the facts before it necessary to insure that there has been compli-
ance with constitutional standards. The court does seem to suggest
that the state has not done enough by simply causing a subpoena to
be issued. If the process server does not use reasonable diligence in
locating the witness, the court seems to imply that the prosecutor has
not done enough to comply with the Barber standard.
SCOPE OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
Article 786 gives little guidance dealing with the scope of ques-
tioning in selecting trial jurors other than to codify the right of coun-
sel to question the prospective jurors themselves." It provides that
the "scope of the examination shall be within the discretion of the
court."" In State v. Jones,"1 the court said that while "it might ap-
pear that article 786 intended to give the trial judge almost unlimited
discretion to control the examination of prospective jurors," 2 counsel
must be "allowed a wide latitude in voir dire examinations," 3 and
"the scope of inquiry is best governed by a liberal discretion on the
77. Id. at 429, 259 So. 2d at 902. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
78. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Pointer v. Texas, 389 U.S. 400 (1965).
79, See State v. Guidry, 160 La. 655, 107 So. 479 (1926) (cited by the court). The
supreme court reversed a conviction when a trial judge, under a local rule of court,
refused to permit the lawyers to examine prospective jurors but rather conducted the
examination himself.
80. LA. CODE CRIM. P. at 786.
81. 282 So. 2d 422 (La. 1973).
82. Id. at 428.
83. Id. at 430.
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part of the court." 4 It is submitted that the court did little in Jones
other than to mandate that a rule of liberal discretion be followed by
trial courts in controlling the scope of voir dire. The court does not
purport to give definite guidelines. By overruling State v. Bell 5 and
State v. Sheppard"8 to the extent that they conflict with the "princi-
ples expressed" in Jones, the court said it was, essentially, returning
to the jurisprudence as it existed at the time of the adoption of the
Code of Criminal Procedure in 1966.87 The court seemed to premise
its holding on State v. Hills.8 The court noted that "paragraph (d)
of the Official Revision Comments (to Art. 786) refers to State v. Hills
... . as if the doctrine of that case qualified the discretion which
article 786 seemed to vest in the trial court." 8 Quoting extensively
from Hills, ° the court emphasized the purpose of voir dire examina-
84. Id.
85. 263 La. 434, 268 So. 2d 610 (1972).
86. 263 La. 379, 268 So. 2d 590 (1972).
87. State v. Jones, 282 So. 2d 422, 430 (La. 1973).
88. 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12 (1961).
89. State v. Jones, 282 So. 2d 422, 429 (La. 1973).
90. "It is a general view as to voir dire examination that the defendant in a
criminal prosecution is entitled to make reasonable and pertinent inquiries of the
prospective juror so that he may exercise intelligently and wisely his right of peremp-
tory challenge-since each party has the right to put questions to a juror not only to
show that there exists proper grounds for a challenge for cause, but to elicit facts to
enable him to decide whether or not he will make a peremptory challenge. (Emphasis
added.) For this reason, a wide latitude is allowed counsel in examining jurors on their
voir dire, and the scope of inquiry is best governed by a liberal discretion on the part
of the Court so that if there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind
which will even subconsciouly affect his decision, this may be uncovered. It is by
examination into the attitudes and inclinations of jurors before they are sworn to try
a case that litigants are enabled to reject those persons, by use of peremptory chal-
lenges where necessary, who are deemed to be unlikely to approach a decision in a
detached and objective manner. The Constitution itself (LA. CONST. of 1921, art.
1 § 10) guarantees to the accused the right to peremptorily challenge jurors, 'the
number of challenges to be fixed by law'; that number, in the trial of any crime for
which the penalty is death or necessarily imprisonment at hard labor, is twelve (R.S.
15:354). The intelligent exercise of the right of rejection, by use of those twelve peremp-
tory challenges, is the meat of the privilege, and can be substantially weakened by a
restriction of questions-the answers to which might be regarded as informative of a
juror's attitude and therefore of vital importance to his defense. In State v. Henry, 196
La. 217, 198 So. 910, 915, this Court quoted with approval from 35 C.J. at pages 387,
405 and 406; 'parties have a right to question jurors on their examination not only for
the purpose of showing grounds for a challenge for cause, but also within reasonable
limits, to elicit such facts as will enable them intelligently to exercise their right of
peremptory challenge, and . . . it is error for the court to exclude questions which are
pertinent for either purpose. . . . The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial
right, and its freest exercise should be permitted.' " State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 395,
129 So. 2d 12, 31 (1961).
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tion by the defendant as not simply to expose challenges for cause,"
but also to aid the defendant in the intelligent exercise of his peremp-
tory challenges.92
Although the question in Jones was one dealing with the juror's
willingness to apply a principle of law,9 3 it is submitted that the rule
of liberal discretion should be applied to other areas as well. The
court reiterated the "recognized distinction between examining a
juror on his knowledge of the law and examining a juror on his ability
and willingness to apply a principle of law. . . ,, 1 Chief Justice
Sanders, in his dissent, suggested that the court should uphold a trial
judge's decision to limit rather carefully the scope of voir dire "espe-
cially when current judicial reform is moving in the dirction of expe-
diting voir dire examination as a means of reducing court delays."9 5
91. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797.
92. Id. art. 799.
93. The question was: "Mr. Juneau, do you believe that if a grand jury indicts
someone this man is guilty?
"By the Court: This is improper, as I've said earlier. We are not going to quiz these
people on their knowledge of the law. He comes in here. He's just as innocent of
experience with the law as your client is with guilt, and we are not going to permit
you to ask him questions about this." The prospective juror was a former member of
the Rapides Parish Grand Jury. State v. Jones, 282 So. 2d 422, 427-28 (La. 1973).
94. Id. at 428.
95. Id. at 433.
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